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Abstract 
This article focusses on two types of constructional effects of indirect evidential marking in Harakmbut (isolate, 
Peru). Both types originate in a clash of interpretation: the use of indirect evidential marking indicates a shift of 
perspective away from the speaker (as if they did not witness the event, thus disclaiming epistemic authority), 
while the events referred to are in principle directly accessible to them. As the signalled shift is not fully realized 
in interpretation, the effects will be characterized as showing perspective persistence. The first type involves 
constructions with a first person agent, and indirect evidential marking is found to produce the interpretation that 
the speaker performed the action referred to unintentionally, finding out about the outcome of this action only 
later. Other types of non-volitional events — without pragmatic inference on the part of the speaker — are found 
not to carry indirect evidential marking; they use different linguistic means to signal non-volitionality. The second 
type involves constructions with impersonal predicates referring to the cycle of the sun, and the use of indirect 
evidential marking yields emphasis on the completion of the event referred to. It is proposed that both types of 
effects can be explained in terms of endpoint emphasis (cf. DeLancey 1985). 
 
1. The Harakmbut language and collection of data  
Harakmbut is an underdescribed language from Amazonian Peru, spoken in a number of ‘native 
communities’ in the departamentos of Madre de Dios and Cusco. The communities, protected by 
national law, are located on the Madre de Dios River and its upper tributaries, such as the Colorado and 
Pukiri Rivers. They border onto the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve, also a protected area, which lies 
in the centre of the Harakmbut homeland. 
The genetic affiliation of Harakmbut is still under discussion. The language has previously been 
classified as an Arawak or Maipuran language by McQuown (1955) and Matteson (1972), but this has 
found little acceptance (Adelaar 2007: 39). Wise (1999: 307) maintains that Harakmbut is commonly 
considered to be an isolate (cf. Dryer & Haspelmath 2013 in WALS). More recently, however, Adelaar 
(2000, 2007) has reopened the debate. Drawing on primarily lexical evidence, he proposes that 
Harakmbut is genetically related to the Brazilian Katukinan family, which may be further linked to 
Macro-Jê. This proposal awaits further corroboration, especially by lexical cognates, as I agree with 
Queixalós (fc.) that the grammatical evidence in favour of a genetic relationship available so far is thin 
and unsystematic. Furthermore, language contact should also be taken into account, as Harakmbut 
displays a number of Western Amazonian grammatical features, as well as features characteristic of the 
Guaporé-Mamoré linguistic area (Crevels & van der Voort 2008) (see Van linden 2019, fc.). 
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In addition, the question has been raised whether Harakmbut should be considered a single language 
with a number of dialectal variants or rather a small language group or family consisting of distinct, 
related languages. The classification of the Harakmbut into seven ethno-linguistic groups (Amarakaeri,1 
Watipaeri, Arasaeri, Sapiteri, Kisambaeri, Pukirieri and Toyoeri) by the anthropologist Andrew Gray 
(1996: 7–9) might hint at the latter option, while linguists such as Helberg (1984, 1990), Wise (1999) 
and Adelaar (2007) have settled on the former. The idea that Harakmbut should be regarded as a single 
language squares with my language consultants’ judgements as well. By now, the most vital varieties 
are the first two listed above. Of many of the other dialects only a handful of speakers — if any — are 
left, and very little information is available (see Van linden fc.). 
Earlier linguistic work on Harakmbut has mainly focussed on the most vital dialect, i.e. 
Amarakaeri/Arakmbut (Hart 1963; Helberg 1984, 1990, 1996; Tripp 1976, 1995). It should be remarked 
that ‘vital’ is a relative term, as Moore (2007: 46) estimates the number of speakers at 1,000, and I 
noticed during my field stays that intergenerational transmission of the language is jeopardized by the 
fear of social stigma. Children are thus mainly raised in Spanish, and acquire only a passive competence 
in Harakmbut. Young adults and speakers up to the age of fifty generally are bilingual in Harakmbut 
and Spanish, while speakers older than fifty are mainly monolingual in Harakmbut. My own fieldwork 
also concentrates on the Amarakaeri/Arakmbut dialect. The data presented in this paper were collected 
through audio recording during three field trips in the summers of 2010, 2011 and 2016 (five months in 
total), in the native communities of Puerto Luz, San José del Karene and Shintuya. So far, I have mainly 
transcribed and analysed elicitation sessions with bilingual speakers (25 to 40 years old), which implies 
that a considerable portion of the data used in Sections 2 to 4 does not represent spontaneous speech. If 
it does, this has been indicated in the example. The practical orthography used is IPA-based, and 
different from the community spelling.2 
This paper focusses on two types of constructional effects of indirect evidential marking in the 
Amarakaeri/Arakmbut dialect. Both types originate in a clash of interpretation: the use of indirect 
marking indicates a shift of perspective away from the speaker (as if they did not witness the event), 
while the events referred to are in principle directly accessible to them. As the shift of perspective is not 
fully realized in interpretation, that is, it does not apply to all the stages of the event at issue, the effects 
will be characterized as perspective persistence phenomena (cf. Gentens et al. 2019; Spronck et al., this 
issue). In the first type, to be discussed in Section 3, the construction features a first person agent, and 
the use of indirect evidential marking results in an interpretation of involuntary action. In the second 
type, to be discussed in Section 4, the construction shows an impersonal predicate referring to the cycle 
of the sun, and the use of indirect evidential marking yields emphasis on the completion of the event 
referred to. It will be proposed that both types of effects can be explained in terms of endpoint emphasis 
as put forward by DeLancey (1985). However, before we home in on these constructional effects of 
                                                                
1 I would like to point out that the speakers of this variety regard the label Amarakaeri as a depreciatory term; it is 
adapted from wa-mba-arak-a-eri (NMZR-VPL-kill-TRNS-AN), a verb-based nominalization meaning ‘(fierce) 
killer/murderer’ (cf. Helberg 1996: 18), which finds its origin in an ancient narrative about the provenance of the 
different ethno-linguistic groups of the Harakmbut people. They prefer to call their variety ‘Arak(m)but’, as 
distinct from the Watipaeri variety, towards whose speakers they generally entertain feelings of enmity rather than 
brotherhood. 
2 In the community spelling, nasal quality of vowels is indicated with a diaeresis rather than a tilde, and the glottal 
stop is represented by an apostrophe rather than the IPA-symbol. In addition, it imposes different spellings for 
allophonic variants (e.g. <ti-> [ʧi] is spelled <chi->, while <to-> remains <to->) as well as for the same allophones 
in different phonetic conditions (e.g. <mb> [mb] is written <mb> post-vocalically, but <b> word-initially and post-
consonantally); the practical orthography used here does not adopt such different spellings.  
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indirect evidential marking, let us take a look at the Harakmbut finite verb form, with a focus on TAME 
marking (Section 2). 
 
2. The Harakmbut finite verb form and evidentiality 
Evidentiality is marked on finite verb forms in Harakmbut, which have the most complex morphological 
template of all word forms. The template is spread over Tables 1 and 2, presenting the prefixes and 
suffixes respectively; both tables include the verb stem slot (see Van linden fc.). In Table 1, five prefix 
slots are fixed, while the verbal plural marker (VPL) and a set of spatial prefixes are positionally flexible, 
entertaining scope relations with fixed-position prefixes. By contrast, the verbal suffixes (Table 2) do 
not take part in any configurational strings. 
 
Table 1. The prefix (Pf) string of Harakmbut finite verb forms 
 
Pf1 Pf2 Pf3 Pf4 Pf5 
Verb stem 
mood+agr BEN APPL CLF/INCORP.N SOC (appl) 




Table 2. The suffix (Sf) string of Harakmbut finite verb forms (cf. Tripp 1976) 
 
Verb stem 
Sf1 Sf2 Sf3 Sf4 Sf5 Sf6 Sf7 
Asp1 TRNS Asp2/AM ANA Asp3 Tense mood+agr; mod; evid 
obligatory      obligatory (but zero exponence possible) 
  
As can be seen in Table 2, evidentiality is flagged in the final suffix slot, in which it is in 
complementary distribution with mood+agreement suffixes and a number of modal suffixes expressing 
epistemic meanings. In (1), for example, the indirect evidential suffix -te precludes the use of the 
indicative mood suffix -ne, which distinguishes between indicative mood (presence of -ne) and 
dubitative mood (absence of -ne) for second person singular subjects (acting on third-person object 
participants). The most important evidential distinction is of the experiential type, indicating whether 
the speaker witnessed the event denoted by the verb form — that is, experienced it directly through 
sensory perception, typically visual — (direct) or did not witness it but learned of it after the fact 
(indirect) (cf. De Haan 2013).  
 
 (1) on-a i-ma-niŋ-to-wa-me-te(*-ne) wa-knda ken-tewapa 
 2SG-NOM 2SG-VPL-BEN-SOC-go-REC.PST-INDIR.EVD(*-IND) NMZR-egg 3-BEN 
 ‘You (sg) took along eggs for them.’ (speaker did not witness it) (cf. Van linden fc.) 
 
In addition to direct and indirect evidential marking, Harakmbut also has an inferential evidential, 
i.e. -ta, which is illustrated in (2).  
 
  
VPL or ≥2 spatial pfs  VPL VPL spatial pf 
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 (2) Javier õʔ-ẽ-tã hak-yo moto o-ta-wadn hak eʔ-ndeaʔ 
 Javier 3SG.IND-be-INFER house-LOC moto 3SG.IND-APPL-sit house NMZR-go.and.face 
 ‘Javier must be at home; his motorbike is in front of his house.’ 
 
The final slot in the verbal suffix string is preceded by the slot dedicated to tense marking (cf. Table 2). 
Harakmbut distinguishes between present (zero-marked) (cf. (2)), which is also used with hodiernal past 
reference, future (-apo), recent past (-me) (cf. (1), (3)) and distant past tense (-uy) (cf. (4)) on finite verb 
forms (cf. Tripp 1976, 1995: 221–222; pace Helberg 1984: 277). As has been noted before (Helberg 
1984: 277–279; Tripp 1995: 222), past forms are obligatorily marked for (non-)experiential 
evidentiality, i.e. direct (zero-marked, cf. (3)) vs. indirect, which is signalled by -(a)te suffixed to past 
tense markings -me (1) and -uy (4), or by the portmanteau marker -tuy (5), which fuses tense and 
evidential categories. Examples (3) to (5) were produced by the same speaker, a woman then in her late 
twenties brought up and living in Shintuya. In (3), she reports to me on a trip to nearby hot springs we 
made together a couple of days earlier. The fact that she experienced the event referred to herself is 
reflected in the use of the indicative mood suffix in the final slot (rather than the indirect evidential 
marker, used in (1)) (note also the first person inclusive marking on the verb).  
 
 (3) ken ãnĩ-ỹõ mbaysik o-kyẽ-me-ne 
 then FILLER-LOC dusk 1PL.INCL-arrive.from.trip-REC.PST-IND 
 ‘Then, eh, we arrived (back home) at dusk.’ (speaker participated in the action; spontaneous 
speech) 
 
 (4) arakmbut õn-mã-ẽn-uy-ate ãnĩ asuk 
 people 3PL.IND-VPL-throw.away-DIST.PST-INDIR.EVD FILLER bark.clothing 
 ‘People gave up wearing, eh, bark clothing (long time ago).’ (speaker did not experience this) 
 
The event referred to in (4) took place well before her birth, not so long after the Arakmbut were 
contacted by Spanish Dominican priests in the 1950s (cf. Gray 1996: 12), so the speaker cannot possibly 
have witnessed it, which motivates the indirect marking. Lastly, the event referred to in (5) occurred 
when the speaker was still a child, and her use of -tuy indicates that she did not witness it. The subject 
participants in (5) are about 8 years older than the speaker, and they met when Luis came from Puerto 
Luz to Shintuya at the age of 12 to attend the missionary boarding school. 
 
 
 (5) on-ma-knĩã-tuy Sintuya-yo 
 3PL.IND-VPL-get.to.know.person-DIST.PST.INDIR.EVD Shintuya-LOC 
  ‘They (i.e. Maribel and Luis) got to know each other in Shintuya (long time ago).’ (speaker did 
not experience this) 
 
 Finally, in terms of basic clause type, evidential marking seems to be generally restricted to verb 
forms of declarative sentences. As detailed in Section 3 below, however, indirect evidential marking is 




3. Indirect evidential marking with first person agents: involuntary action 
The first type of constructional effect of indirect evidential marking in Harakmbut relates to non-
volitionality. It will become clear that this effect is restricted to a specific kind of non-volitionality, i.e. 
involving a pragmatic inference on the part of the speaker, who infers the execution of their own earlier 
action on the basis of evidence available to them only after the action. Other kinds of non-volitional 
events or situations — which use non-visual evidentials in other languages — will be shown to use 
different linguistic marking in Harakmbut. 
The constructional effect studied here involves constructions with a first person agent in which the 
use of indirect evidential marking leads to an interpretation of involuntary action. Consider the 
contrastive set of examples in (6) and (7).  
 
 (6) oʔ-wek-uy-ate keme 
 3SG.IND-wound.with.arrow-DIST.PST-INDIR.EVD tapir 
 ‘He pierced a tapir (long time ago).’ 
 
 (7) ih-arak-tuy keme 
 1SG.IND-kill-DIST.PST.INDIR.EVD tapir 
 ‘I killed a tapir without realizing it (long time ago).’ 
 
In (6), which features a third-person agent subject, the indirect evidential suffix marks a shift away from 
the speaker as source of information, since they are signalled not to have witnessed the action referred 
to. By contrast, in (7), which has a first person agent subject, the use of indirect evidential marking 
causes a clash of interpretation, since the speaker is marked as not having witnessed an event they are 
presented to have directly participated in as an agent, and therefore to have first-hand knowledge of. 
The resulting interpretation is one of involuntary action, as reflected in the provided translation: the 
speaker killed the tapir without realizing it; they were not in full control of the event referred to. (Note 
that in (7) the indirect evidential marker is fused with the distant past tense marker; -tuy is also 
grammatical in (6), instead of -uy-ate.)3    
Let us also compare (7) to (3) above, which features a first person agent subject as well, but no 
indirect evidential marking. Example (3) is naturally interpreted as the speaker reporting on her having 
been voluntarily engaged in the (self-motion) event referred to, having first-hand knowledge thereof. 
By contrast, example (7), which I collected while eliciting acceptability judgements of construed 
examples, was explained to me as fitting a context in which the speaker had gone off hunting, had shot 
arrows in the forest (intentionally), and after having been told that one of these arrows killed a tapir, 
reports on this event by using an indirect evidential. That is, the speaker was not aware of (the result of) 
their action while executing it, but draws the conclusion that their earlier action took place on the basis 
of indirect evidence. 
While (7) was collected in an elicitation context, example (8) is taken from a spontaneous 
conversation between an elderly mother and her adult son, who are trying to arrange the pictures from 
                                                                
3 Note incidentally that the indirect evidential marking does not bear on the morphosyntactic transitivity of the 
construction in (7), which is ‘as transitive as’ (6). More generally then, the Harakmbut data provide further 
confirmation that involuntary agent constructions are not necessarily associated with reduced morphosyntactic 
transitivity (cf. Fauconnier 2011, 2012). 
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San Roque et al.’s (2012) ‘Family problems’ task into order. The example involves a kind of non-
volitionality similar to that in (7).  
    
 (8) noŋ-pa-nda-niŋ=piʔ oʔ-ka-te 
 other-manner-NDA4-SIM=INDET  1PL-do-INDIR.EVD 
 ‘I think we made a mistake.’ (Literally: ‘It seems we did something like the other/wrong way 
without realizing it’) [spontaneous speech]  
 
The son is suggesting a particular order for a number of pictures, when — all of a sudden — he utters (8) 
— which provokes an immediate, uninterpretable interjection-like response from his mother — and he 
goes on to propose a different ordering of the events depicted. As the interlocutors are deliberately 
engaged in this task of ordering pictures so that they make a story, the kind of non-volitionality involved 
in (8) is that of an action that was performed unintentionally, with an undesired outcome, which the 
speaker becomes aware of only later (by looking at the order of the pictures and seeing a better solution). 
In both (7) and (8), then, the notion of non-volitionality arises as a pragmatic inference on the part of 
the speaker, who learns about their execution of a certain action on the basis of evidence available to 
them at a moment posterior to that action. It should be noted that in Harakmbut zero present tense 
marking can be used to situate events in the hodiernal past, i.e. before the time of utterance but still on 
the day the utterance was made, as in (8) above and (9), (21), and (22) below. 
 Harakmbut is certainly not the only language in which indirect evidential marking in first person 
agent constructions leads to the interpretation of involuntary action. In fact, this constructional effect of 
non-visual, non-witnessed or indirect evidential marking has been described before for a number of 
languages, such as Lhasa Tibetan (Sino-Tibetan, DeLancey 1985), Bagvalal (Nakh-Daghestanian, 
Tatevosov 2001: 446–447), Tariana (Arawakan, Aikhenvald 2003: 296–297), and Tucano (Tucanoan, 
Ramirez 1997: 133). Other types of evidential markers have been observed to have similar effects, e.g. 
the inferential evidential in Kolyma Yukaghir (Yukaghir, Maslova 2003). Curnow (2003), Aikhenvald 
(2004) and Fauconnier (2012: 129–130) provide yet more examples of languages in which non-
volitionality is expressed through evidentials. What is shared by all of the constructions concerned — 
irrespective of the type of evidential marking — is that they are restricted to contexts of past actions 
performed by the speaker.  
These restrictions are crucial to the explanation put forward for this constructional effect of non-
visual/non-witnessed/indirect evidential marking, as they ensure that the action referred to is in principle 
inherently knowable to the speaker. As noted by DeLancey (1985), prototypical agentive actions can be 
conceived of as implying a causal chain of situations: (i) an act of volition or intention, (ii) realization 
of the intended action, and (iii) the state resulting from that action. In constructions like (7)–(8), 
evidential marking coding that the speaker did not witness the event and thus disclaims epistemic 
authority implies that knowledge about the phases leading up to the endpoint of the event is not 
accessible, and this is because the agent is engaged non-voluntarily. The indirect evidential could thus 
be taken to apply to stage (i) especially, which the speaker does not “see” or has no direct access to (cf. 
Curnow 2003: 49). More generally, cases like (7)–(8) reflect the principle of endpoint emphasis 
                                                                
4 The analysis of the suffix -nda is still unclear. When attached to a case-marked noun or pronoun, it functions as 
a focus marker (see Van linden fc.). In adjective constructions (noŋ is a deictic adjective), by contrast, it does not 
signal information focus or increased degree (pace Tripp 1995: 197). In view of its occurrence on several types of 
adnominal modifiers and also adverbs, as well as on nominalized verb forms coding the adverbial relation of 
simultaneity (e.g. [15] in Section 3), its function might be that of producing a general modifier. 
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underlying involuntary agent constructions (cf. Fauconnier 2011, 2013), which will also be invoked to 
explain the second constructional effect of indirect evidential marking (Section 4). 
Returning to the Harakmbut data, indirect evidential marking is — in addition to actions — also found 
on states with a similar constructional effect, which has not received much attention in the literature so 
far. The example in (9) is particularly interesting as it constitutes an interrogative sentence with a second-
person subject. Compare (9) to (10); the two examples differ minimally in the presence of an indirect 
evidential; some speakers would add the clitic =piʔ (used in (8) above) to menpa in (9) as well.  
 
 (9) men-pa ĩʔ-ẽʔ-ãtẽ? 
 which-manner 2SG-be-INDIR.EVD 
 ‘What happened to you?’  
 
 (10) men-pa ĩʔ-ẽʔ-Ø? 
 which-manner 2SG-be-DUB 
 ‘How are you?’ 
 
While (10) serves as a general question querying the addressee’s state of mind or health at the moment 
of speech, (9) gets a hodiernal past-tense interpretation (cf. (8)) and its subject gets a patientive 
interpretation, which both point to a change of state reading. Contexts of use of (9) include cases in 
which it is immediately clear to the speaker that something happened to the addressee that the latter was 
not voluntarily involved in, e.g. they were stung by insects or suffered from heat stroke. Thus, like in 
(7) and (8), indirect evidential marking again leads to an interpretation of reduced control on the part of 
the subject participant. The examples given so far suggest that the constructional effect of indirect 
evidential marking operates on an egophoric basis (cf. San Roque et al. 2018), in that it is only available 
to constructions in which the subject is charged with epistemic authority. In declarative sentences like 
(7) and (8), it is the speaker that has authoritative knowledge of the event referred to, while in 
interrogatives like (9) the speaker concedes authority to the addressee (see Zemp, this issue). In (9), the 
speaker thus anticipates that the addressee may not have full knowledge of the stages leading up to the 
present state, which itself is directly accessible to both speaker and addressee; the indirect evidential 
triggers the inference that the addressee was not voluntarily involved in the stages leading up to the 
resultant state. 
In terms of the kind of non-volitionality, the Harakmbut declarative examples in (7)–(8) are very 
similar to first-person agent constructions showing an inferential evidential in Kalasha (Indo-Aryan, 
Bashir 1988: 54) and those with an apparent evidential in Tuyuca (Tucanoan, Barnes 1984: 260), as 
these also involve an inference on the part of the speaker that an earlier — unintentional — action took 
place. The same goes for constructions featuring verb forms traditionally labelled as perfects in the 
Nakh-Daghestanian language Bagvalal, indicated in boldface in (11), which with first person agents 
produce a “lack of consciousness effect” (Tatevosov 2001: 446). However, while the Harakmbut 
examples imply the same type of inference as in (11), they are different from (11) in that they do not 
generally involve agents whose involvement in an event is volitional, but who accidentally target their 





 (11) den muwa še:-b-o ek’oa 
 1SG.ERG rye sow-N-CONV AUX.PRS 
 ‘(It appears) I sowed rye (instead of wheat).’ (Tatevosov 2001: 447) 
 
The remainder of this section aims to determine the scope of the constructional effect of indirect 
evidential marking in first-person agent constructions in Harakmbut by looking at how other kinds of 
non-volitional events are expressed. Inadvertent breaking events, for example, are characterized by a 
different kind of non-volitionality than the ‘inferential’ one in (7)–(9), as they involve past actions which 
a speaker performed unintentionally and which they were aware of at the time of their execution (cf. 
Curnow 2003: 47). Whereas such events are coded with non-visual evidentials in Tucano (Tucanoan, 
Ramirez 1997: 133),5 Harakmbut does not use evidential marking in such contexts. Specifically, the 
verbs ‘tear’ (12) and ‘break’ (13) show different argument structure properties as well as different 
perfective suffixes depending on their (non-)volitional event semantics. It should be noted that perfective 
aspect marking is special in Harakmbut in that it is coded by two distinct suffixes that additionally code 
(non-)volitionality, i.e. whether the A/S-participant is intentionally involved in the action referred to or 
not.6 They naturally occur on telic, punctual events, cf. (12)–(13), but are also found on stative 
predicates, in which they induce a change-of-state interpretation (see (20) below). 
 
 (12) (a) i-k-puk-an-me-y ilo 
  1SG.IND-SEPARATION7-tear-PFV.VOL-REC.PST-1.IND thread 
  ‘I tore the thread (deliberately).’  
 (b) mbe-ta-k-puk-on-ne ilo 
  3SG>1/2SG-APPL-SEPARATION-tear-PFV.NVOL-IND thread 
  ‘The thread got torn on me’ (Literally: ‘The thread got torn with respect to me; the 
thread got torn to my detriment.’) 
 
 (13) (a) iʔ-sak-an-me-y mbaʔegŋ 
  1SG.IND-break-PFV.VOL-REC.PST-1.IND drinking.glass 
  ‘I broke the glass (deliberately).’  
(17) (b) oʔ-sak-on-me mbaʔegŋ 
  3SG.IND-break-PFV.NVOL-REC.PST drinking.glass 
  ‘The glass broke (accidentally).’  
 
Volitional actions, as in (12a) and (13a), are expressed by transitive clauses with agentive subjects 
(indexed on the verb in (12a) and (13a)) and verb forms showing the volitional perfective suffix -an. 
Non-volitional actions, as in (12b) and (13b), by contrast, are expressed by basically intransitive clauses 
with patientive subjects and the non-volitional perfective suffix -on. This is especially clear in (13b), 
                                                                
5 Note that non-visual evidential marking in Tucano (and Tariana, see below) has a different functional load 
from indirect evidential marking in Harakmbut, in that in third person subject contexts it signals that the speaker 
had direct access to the event through a sense other than sight (Aikhenvald 2003: 294; Ramirez 1997: 129). 
6 Note that the category of volitionality here relates to whether the subject participant is intentionally involved in 
the action referred to or not. This is different from how volitionality is defined, for example, by Haller (2000: 176) 
for Shigatse Tibetan and Themchen Tibetan, in which this category is strictly speaker-related (i.e. whether the 
event referred to takes place with the intention of the speaker or not). 
7 The spatial prefix ok-~k- expresses ‘separation’ (Tripp 1995: 219; Van linden fc.); here it conveys that the tearing 
event led to two separate parts of the thread. 
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which has only one argument participant, i.e. the patientive subject mbaʔegŋ. Clauses like (12b) are also 
basically intransitive, but show the — valency-increasing — applicative prefix ta-. In (12b), the 
involuntary agent is coded as a malefactive participant, which the applicative ta- promotes to (applied) 
object status; this results in a portmanteau prefix on the verb indexing both the third person subject ilo 
and the applied object (first person singular). The examples I have collected so far indicate that 
inadvertent tearing events obligatorily code the involuntary agent and use constructions similar to (12b) 
(e.g. constructions referring to the getting torn of tents and pants, which contain the verb -sirat ‘tear (of 
fabric)’), while inadvertent breaking events can be coded by structures similar to (12b) or (13b) (e.g. 
constructions referring to the breaking of arrows, which contain the verb -ket ‘break (of solid objects)’). 
While unintentional cutting events involve the same kind of non-volitionality as unintentional 
breaking events, verbs of cutting and breaking have been found to divide universally into two distinct 
classes, with different kinds of meanings and distinct argument structures (Levin & Rappaport 1995; 
Majid et al. 2008: 237). In Tariana (Arawakan) inadvertent cutting events are coded with non-visual 
evidentials (Aikhenvald 2003: 297), but in Harakmbut they pattern more similarly to breaking events 
than to the events in (7)–(8). While volitional events are expressed by transitive clauses (14a), non-
volitional events are coded by intransitive clauses whose verb form may incorporate a body-part noun 
to specify where exactly the agent cut themself (14b). Like the inadvertent breaking events in (12b) and 
(13b), (14b) features the non-volitional perfective suffix -on. However, (14b) is different from (12b) and 
(13b) in that the involuntary agent is coded as the subject of the clause, just like the agent of the volitional 
event in (14a); -tegŋ ‘cut’ clearly is no ergative verb like -sak ‘break’. 
 
 (14) (a) ih-mba-tegŋ-me-y mbiʔigŋ  
  1SG.IND-VPL-cut-REC.PST-1.IND fish  
   ‘I cut the fish (more than one fish) (deliberately).’  
(17) (b) i-mbaʔ-tegŋ-on-me-y siroʔ-a  
  1SG.IND-hand-cut-PFV.NVOL-REC.PST-1.IND machete-INS 
  ‘I cut my hand with a machete (accidentally).’  
 
It should be noted that I also found slightly different structures expressing cutting events. Volitional 
events with -tegŋ, for example, also show the transitivizer suffix -a added to the verb stem. This suffix 
has distinct but related functions; it can (i) transitivize intransitive verbs, (ii) function as a (direct) 
causative marker on intransitive and transitive verbs, and (iii) signal a high degree of intensity of the 
action on transitive verbs.8 It is the latter function that accounts for its possible presence in volitional 
cutting event structures. Non-volitional events, in turn, may lack the non-volitional perfective suffix if 
it is clear from the context that the action was unintentional (cf. Van linden 2019: 475, ex. (39)). 
Let us turn to events that are unintentional by default, like ‘fall’, ‘trip’ or ‘slip’. In Tucano 
(Tucanoan), for example, cases like (15) below are marked by the non-visual evidential (Ramirez 1997: 
133, as discussed in Curnow 2003: 48). This is not the case in Harakmbut; compare examples (15) to 




                                                                
8 Hopper & Thompson (1980: 264) mention three other languages in which causatives and intensives use identical 
coding, i.e. Indonesian, Arabic and Chichewa. 
10 
 
(15) e-waʔ-e-a-nda     ih-kot-me-y 
 NMZR-go-ITER-NOM-NDA 1SG-fall-REC.PST-1.IND 
 ‘I fell while I was walking.’ (Literally: ‘I, who was walking, fell’, or ‘I fell walking’) (cf. Van 
linden 2019: 477, ex. (41)) 
 
 (16) mbe-ku-ti-kot-uy-ne apoareʔ-a taʔmba-ya 
 3SG>1/2SG-head-SPAT:UP9-fall-DIST.PST-IND papaya-NOM swidden-LOC 
 ‘A papaya fell on my head in the swidden long ago.’ (cf. Van linden fc.) 
 
 (17) o-k-mba-kot-onka-me-te yave An-ta 
 3SG.IND-SEPARATION-VPL-fall-SUDDENLY-REC.PST-INDIR.EVD key An-ACC 
 ‘An’s keys fell all of a sudden.’ (Literally: ‘The keys suddenly fell away from An.’) 
 
From these examples we can gather that predicates denoting (by default) inadvertent events like ‘fall’ 
take direct evidential (zero-)marking when the speaker witnessed the event — and was even involved in 
it, as subject in (15), or ‘goal’ in (16) — and combine with indirect marking when the speaker did not 
witness the event, as in (17), which is understood as referring to An dropping her keys unintentionally. 
Put differently, intransitive predicates having patientive subjects (so-called ‘unaccusative’ verbs, cf. 
Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1995) do not receive indirect evidential marking with first-person subjects, 
cf. (15), nor do events that affect the speaker, cf. (16).  
While (by default) non-volitional events like ‘fall’ are still perceptually observable, this is not the 
case for psychological/cognitive states like ‘fear’ and bodily states like ‘have fever’. In both Tariana 
(Arawakan, Aikhenvald 2003: 298–299) and Tucano (Tucanoan, Ramirez 1997: 134, as discussed in 
Curnow 2003: 44), such states use non-visual evidentials with first-person subjects. The Harakmbut data 
are again different, in that such cases invariably show direct evidential (zero-)marking, as illustrated in 
(18a) expressing a psychological state and (18b) expressing a bodily state.  
 
 (18) (a) ih-mẽ-puk-me-y (b) ih-ku-tiri-me-y 
  1SG-(liver-tear)fear-REC.PST-1.IND  1SG-head-ache-REC.PST-1.IND 
  ‘I was afraid.’  ‘I had a headache.’ 
 
In fact, in contexts like (18a) and (18b) as well as in events like ‘fall’, the difference between Harakmbut 
on the one hand and Tariana and Tucano on the other has to do with the type of evidentiality system 
these languages exhibit. While Harakmbut distinguishes between direct, indirect and inferential 
evidentiality, the other two languages show far more complex systems with two types of direct 
evidentiality, i.e. visual versus non-visual (Aikhenvald 2003: 294; Ramirez 1997: 129). That is, for non-
volitional events like ‘fall’, psychological/cognitive states like ‘fear’ and bodily states like ‘have fever’ 
the three languages all use (a type of) direct evidential marking with first person subjects. 
Psychological/cognitive states and bodily states with third person subjects can but need not take indirect 
evidential marking in Harakmbut, cf. (19) and (20). 
 
  
                                                                
9 The spatial prefix ti- indicates location high up; here it refers to the falling movement of the papaya from high 
up onto the speaker’s head. 
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(19) An o-mẽ-puk-me petpet-ta 
 An 3SG.IND-(liver-tear)fear-REC.PST jaguar-ACC 
 ‘An was afraid of the jaguar.’ 
 
 (20) sũwĩt-ta on-tiaway-po on-mẽ-puk-on-tuy 
 humming.bird-ACC 3PL.IND-see-DEP 3PL.IND-(liver-tear)fear-PFV.NVOL-DIST.PST.INDIR.EVD 
 petpet-ta 
 jaguar-ACC 
 ‘When they saw the humming bird, they began to fear the jaguar (long time ago).’ 
 
While (20) refers to a passage from a narrative transmitted orally from one generation to another, (19) 
refers to a situation that occurred in a community different from the speaker’s (and from the place of 
recording). It should thus be noted that the speaker in (19) certainly did not have first-hand knowledge 
of this situation, but yet did not use indirect evidential marking. However, both (19) and (20) were 
elicited in translation sessions, so we need to be careful here. What is also interesting to note is that the 
perfective suffix in (20), which forces a change-of-state interpretation onto the stative predicate ‘fear’, 
is the non-volitional paradigmatic variant -on. 
In conclusion, the Harakmbut data thus indicate that indirect evidential marking produces the 
interpretation that a first person agent performed an action unintentionally, whose outcome this agent 
becomes aware of only later. Situations in which non-volitionality does not arise as a pragmatic 
inference from the speaker (having to infer their own earlier action) do not use indirect evidential 
marking. The discussion above showed that Harakmbut shows a far more restricted use of evidential 
marking with first person subjects in non-volitional contexts than other Amazonian languages like 
Tariana and Tucano. In these languages the interpretation of involuntary action is observed with a type 
of direct evidential, i.e. non-visual, in inadvertent breaking and cutting events, ‘default’ non-volitional 
events like ‘fall’, psychological/cognitive states and bodily states. 
 
4. Indirect evidential marking with impersonal predicates: completion 
The second type of constructional effect has — to my knowledge — not been discussed before. It is 
different from the first one in that it arises in constructions that do not involve the speaker as an argument 
participant. More specifically, indirect evidential marking is found on events that do not have any 
participant at all, i.e. impersonal predicates referring to the cycle of the sun, which are subsumed under 
meteorological predications in the papers in Malchukov & Siewierska (2011). Such temporal verbs 
denote events that are clearly visible to the speaker; yet they often — but not obligatorily, see (24) below 
— carry indirect evidential marking. Examples are given in (21)–(22), which are zero-marked for present 
tense. Like in (8) and (9) above, they receive a hodiernal past reading. 
 
 (21) oʔ-sik-ate 
3SG.IND-black-INDIR.EVD 
‘It has become dark.’ 
 
 (22) oʔ-me-ate 
3SG.IND-dawn-INDIR.EVD 




The language consultants I worked with told me that the verb forms in (21) and (22) came to be used as 
greetings after contact with Spanish Dominican missionaries in the 1950s (cf. Gray 1996: 12), with (21) 
corresponding to Spanish buenas noches ‘good evening’ and (22) to buenos días ‘good morning’. 
However, these greetings are not frequently used in the communities I collected data. The traditional 
way of greeting in Harakmbut uses verb forms that refer to the action of the speaker or addressee, e.g. 
(23), used in contexts of leave-taking. 
 
 (23) ih-wa-y 
1SG-go-1.IND 
‘I go.’ (functionally equivalent to ‘goodbye’) 
 
I propose that this second type of constructional effect also originates in a clash of interpretation: 
again, the use of indirect evidential marking indicates a shift of perspective away from the speaker (with 
the speaker disclaiming epistemic authority signalling they did not witness the event), while the events 
referred to are in principle available to everyone present.10 This second effect thus also instantiates 
perspective persistence: the shift of perspective is not fully realized in interpretation (cf. Gentens et al. 
2019: 159; Spronck et al., this issue), as it does not apply to all the phases of the event talked about. 
This is why this second type of effect can equally well be explained in terms of endpoint emphasis: like 
in cases with first person agents such as (7)–(8), the indirect evidential marking implies that knowledge 
about the phases leading up to the endpoint of the event is not accessible, in contrast to knowledge about 
the resultant state. The speaker may not have witnessed the process of it becoming dark, or of the sun 
rising, but has access to the resultant states of these events. The evidential marking thus highlights the 
completion of the event; its function verges on that of a completive aspect marker. The latter term is 
used here in the sense of Bybee et al. (1994: 57): it emphasizes that the action represented by the verb 
was carried out to completion. This is rendered by the use of present perfect tense forms in the English 
translations of the Harakmbut present-tense forms in (21)–(22). My language consultants translated the 
forms with an indefinite past tense in Spanish.  
The affinity between non-witnessed evidential marking and completive aspect/perfect markers is also 
evidenced in other languages. In the Caucasian languages Georgian (Kartvelian, Hewitt 1995: 259) and 
Bagvalal (Nakh-Daghestanian, Tatevosov 2001: 446–447), for example, verb forms analysed as perfects 
often receive a non-witnessed or inferential evidential interpretation (cf. Curnow 2003: 40–42). There 
is also a link between completive aspect marking and non-volitionality. Fauconnier (2012: 78–83; 2013) 
shows that in languages from four different families (Japanese-Korean, Dravidian, Indo-European and 
Sino-Tibetan) involuntary agent constructions can use a completive marker. Fauconnier’s (2013: 35) 
semantic account is similar to that proposed for the use of indirect evidential marking to code non-
volitional events: like indirect evidentials, completive markers can be used to yield emphasis on the 
completion of an action as unexpected and unanticipated. 
Finally, on a more speculative note, indirect evidential marking on verbs referring to the cycle of the 
sun in Harakmbut also seems to signal completion in terms of discursive interaction and chains of 
                                                                
10 The reason for disclaiming epistemic authority here is different from that for the first effect of indirect evidential 
marking discussed in Section 3, as here the speaker is not involved as an agent. As suggested by an anonymous 
referee, the speaker’s disclaim here arises from the fact that the observed event is not exclusively accessible to the 
speaker, but also to the interlocutor.  
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actions. When used as ‘hispanicized’ greetings, confirmation — typically taking the form of a return 
greeting featuring the same expressions as in (21)–(22) — is expected, but nothing else. When used in 
their original meaning, expressing the speaker’s observation on the position of the sun, examples (21)–
(22) do not demand any type of response. Importantly, such literal uses are not followed by a call for 
action by the speaker either. If the speaker wants to draw the interlocutor’s attention to the position of 
the sun to justify an ensuing directive speech act, they resort to a different verb form, featuring the 
suffix -nde, which expresses the temporal adverbial meaning ‘already’ (cf. Van linden fc.), as illustrated 
in (24). 
 
 (24) oʔ-sik-nde an-mba-kudn hak-yo  
 3SG.IND-black-ALREADY 2PL.IMP-VPL-enter house-LOC 
 ‘It has become dark already; enter (you all) into your houses.’ 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has focussed on two constructional effects of indirect evidential marking in Harakmbut, more 
specifically the Amarakaeri/Arakmbut variety. Both involve an apparent mismatch between meaning 
and form; they use marking that indicates a shift of perspective away from the speaker, but this shift is 
not fully realized in the interpretation. The first effect involves constructions with first person agents, 
and indirect evidential marking is found to produce the interpretation that the speaker(s) performed the 
action referred to unintentionally, finding out about the result of this action only later on. The second 
effect involves constructions with impersonal predicates referring to the cycle of the sun, and the use of 
indirect evidential marking emphasizes the completion of the event referred to. Both types thus originate 
in a clash of interpretation: the use of indirect marking indicates a shift of perspective away from the 
speaker (with the speaker disclaiming epistemic authority), while the events referred to are in principle 
directly accessible to them. With the signalled shift of perspective not fully realized in interpretation (as 
it does not apply to all the phases of the event at issue) and with the concomitant addition of speaker-
related meanings such as non-volitionality (on the part of the speaker only) and completion emphasis, 
the effects have been characterized as showing perspective persistence (cf. Gentens et al. 2019: 159; 
Spronck et al., this issue). 
While the first effect has been described for other languages before (e.g. Aikhenvald 2004; Curnow 
2003), the second effect is thought to be new, but at the same time not very surprising in view of, for 
instance, data from Caucasian languages. While the Harakmbut data indicate that the category of 
evidentiality may extend into the aspectual domain — with indirect evidential marking expressing 
completive aspect — Causasian languages like Georgian (Kartvelian, Hewitt 1995: 259) and Bagvalal 
(Nakh-Daghestanian, Tatevosov 2001: 446–447) show the opposite direction of semantic extension of 
grammatical categories, with verb forms analysed as perfects often receiving a non-witnessed or 
inferential evidential interpretation (cf. Curnow 2003: 40–42). In addition, it proved possible to identify 
a single principle that underlies the use of indirect evidential marking in both effects, which is that of 
endpoint emphasis, invoked by DeLancey (1985) to explain the use of indirect evidentials in involuntary 
agent constructions (see Section 3). Fauconnier (2012, 2013) invoked the same principle to account for 
completive aspect marking in involuntary agent constructions, and the Harakmbut data suggested that it 
also motivates the use of indirect evidentials on impersonal constructions referring to the cycle of the 
sun (Section 4). 
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In examining the scope of the first constructional effect of indirect evidential marking in Harakmbut, 
in which the category of evidentiality is seen to extend into the domain of event semantics in general 
and of volitionality in particular, it was found that it applies to non-volitional actions as well as states, 
but only in cases where there is a pragmatic inference on the part of the speaker (or rather, the participant 
that has epistemic authority), which necessarily implies a time interval between the event referred to and 
the speaker’s awareness of its resultant state. Interestingly, non-volitional actions or states in which there 
is no such pragmatic inference do not feature indirect evidential marking in Harakmbut. Other 
Amazonian languages such as Tariana (Aikhenvald 2003: 296–297) and Tucano (Tucanoan, Ramirez 
1997: 133–134), for which the same constructional effect of an interpretation of involuntary action has 
been noted with non-visual evidential marking, do extend this non-visual evidential marking to far more 
non-volitional contexts, such as inadvertent cutting and breaking events, perceptually observable events 
that are non-volitional by default (e.g. ‘fall’), as well as non-observable psychological/cognitive states 
like ‘fear’ and bodily states like ‘have fever’. It should be kept in mind, though, that in these languages 
non-visual evidential marking is still of the direct evidential type (in the sense of De Haan (2013)), as it 
signals that knowledge is accessible through the senses other than sight. As the situations discussed in 
this paper do not exhaust all possible kinds of non-volitional events or states, future research could aim 
for a more comprehensive study of non-volitionality in Harakmbut, covering also, for instance, 
involuntary bodily activities like ‘snore’ or involuntary bodily processes like ‘cough’. The analysis could 
also focus more on the speaker’s appraisal of the outcome of unintentional actions, as desirable or 
undesirable. Such a study is expected to enhance our current understanding of event semantics and non-
volitionality more generally.  
A final question raised by this study pertains to the link between involuntary agent constructions and 
egophoric patterning, discussed in Section 3. Is this link cross-linguistically recurrent, and can additional 
instantiations be motivated by the principle of endpoint emphasis as well (see Zemp, this issue)? Further 
research might also point to function-form mismatches in other areas of grammar that also operate on 
an egophoric basis. 
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1 1st person 
2 2nd person 
3 3rd person 
> acting on 
ACC accusative 
AM associated motion 
AN animate 








DEP dependent verb form 





INCORP.N incorporated noun 
IND  indicative 
INDIR.EVD indirect evidential 
INDET indeterminate 











REC.PST recent past 
SG singular 
SIM similative 




VPL verbal plural 
  
 
 
 
